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Abstract—With web applications becoming a preferred method
of presenting graphical user interfaces to users, software vulner-
abilities affecting web applications are becoming more and more
prevalent and devastating. Some of these vulnerabilities, such
as directory traversal attacks, have varying defense mechanisms
and mitigations that can be difficult to understand, analyze, and
test. Gaps in the testing of these directory traversal defense
mechanisms can lead to vulnerabilities that allow attackers to
read sensitive data from files or even execute malicious code.
This paper presents an analysis of some currently used direc-
tory traversal attack defenses and presents a new, stack-based
algorithm to help prevent these attacks by safely canonicalizing
user-supplied path strings. The goal of this algorithm is to be
small, easy to test, cross-platform compatible, and above all,
intuitive. We provide a proof of correctness and verification
strategies using symbolic execution for the algorithm. We hope
that the algorithm is simple and effective enough to help move
developers towards a unified defense against directory traversal
attacks.
Index Terms—directory, path, traversal, vulnerability, algo-
rithm, security, web, application
I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of Web 2.0, web application usage is on the rise,
and so are web application security vulnerabilities. Between
2016 and 2017, the number of vulnerabilities published to the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) increased by 127%
with web application vulnerabilities making up 51% of all
disclosed vulnerabilities for 2017 [1]. Despite a large amount
of research and literature on preventing certain vulnerability
classes that plague web applications–e.g. SQL injection and
cross-site scripting [2]–[4]–there does not seem to be much
literature on directory traversal vulnerabilities which made up
22% of 2017s vulnerability disclosures [1]. Furthermore, a lot
of material on directory traversal attacks simply recommend
using web application scanners to detect these vulnerabilities.
There are two problems with this approach: finding vulnerabil-
ities is not the same as fixing them, and many scanners using
default configurations fail to detect traversal vulnerabilities [5].
More effective approaches to preventing directory traver-
sal attacks include whitelisting [6]–[8], removing traversal
characters from path strings [9]–[11], and canonicalizing path
strings to obtain an absolute file name [12]–[14]. Trying to
prevent these attacks using any one of these solutions presents
challenges. For example, whitelisting-only approaches leave
holes in defenses when paths contain symbolic links, methods
removing traversal characters are often semantically incorrect
or have memory-safety issues, and path string canonicalization
relies on the filesystem and is often not cross-platform or
lightweight.
This paper presents an algorithm that prevents directory
traversal attacks and solves the issues presented by the afore-
mentioned mitigations. We use both whitelisting and path
string canonicalization to help create a solid defense against di-
rectory traversal attacks. The algorithm can handle path strings
containing symbolic links and is cross-platform, lightweight,
intuitive, and simple to verify using symbolic execution.
More background information on path string semantics,
directory traversal vulnerabilities, and currently used mitiga-
tions is presented in Section 2. We present our algorithm and
a proof-of-correctness in Section 3. We discuss verification
strategies for implementations of our algorithm in Section
4. Section 5 details advantages, concerns, and concluding
remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Directory Structure and Traversal
A path string is a string that denotes the location of a
file or directory on a systems file system. Fig. 1 shows a
minimal example of a hierarchical file system for a Linux
system composed of the root directory, ”/”, and the ”www”
and ”home” directories that are housed in the root directory.
The user folder for the user named ”alice” can be represented
by the path string, ”/home/alice/”; this path string starts with
the root directory, ”/”, traverses through the ”home” directory,
and then selects the ”alice” directory inside.
Some file systems include special characters and directories
that allow users to easily traverse this hierarchy. Not repre-
sented in Fig. 1 are the hidden ”.” and ”..” directories contained
inside each directory. These special names refer to directories
relative to the directory that they are inside; the ”..” directory
really refers to the parent directory of the current directory, and
the ”.” directory refers to the current directory. For example,
if we are inside of the ”/home/alice” directory, then ”..” refers
to ”/home/” and ”.” refers to ”/home/alice/”.
Attackers routinely use these special directory identifiers
to traverse file hierarchies to reach restricted directories. For
example, if a program is supposed to use a user-supplied path
string to retrieve a file from inside Alices home folder, but the
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
04
50
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
3 A
ug
 20
19
Fig. 1. Example directory structure for a Linux system
user instead supplies a path string of ”../../www/html/”, then
they can potentially access restricted files in other branches of
the file system. This is what is commonly known as a directory
traversal or path traversal attack.
B. Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities
Directory traversal vulnerabilities are caused by a program
using a user-supplied path string to fetch or download files
without checking that a path string refers to the correct
file. Web applications are especially vulnerable to directory
traversal issues as web apps routinely retrieve and store user-
uploaded files on the web applications file system.
Fig. 2. Example malicious PHP file contents
For example, consider a PHP web forum written that allows
site members to upload profile pictures as jpg files to the
endpoint, ”myforum.net/userprofile.php?picture=profile.jpg”.
Suppose instead that a user uploads the code shown in Fig. 2
with a filename of ”../../shell.php” or with however many ”../”
tokens as required to reach the web applications code directory.
Then, an attacker can make a request to this endpoint–i.e.
”myforum.net/shell.php”–to execute arbitrary PHP code on the
webserver.
C. Currently Used Mitigations
1) Removing Traversal Characters: Approaches that try
to prevent directory traversal attacks by removing substrings
such as ”../” from the path string normally do so in order
to allow flexibility in file selection while blocking a small
amount of blacklisted security-critical files. Take for exam-
ple mini httpd–a fork-based HTTP server used to serve the
http://routerlogin.net page on some NETGEAR routers [10]–
and thttpd–a small, fast, and secure HTTP server that claims
to power some popular sites such as images.paypal.com,
garfield.com, drudgereport.com, the official website of the
Sovereign Principality of Sealand, etc [9]. Both of these HTTP
servers are developed and maintained by the same company,
ACME Labs [9], [10], so both use the de dotdot algorithm
shown in Fig. 3 to remove directory traversal characters from
user-supplied path strings. From looking through the source
code of both HTTP servers, we presume that the HTTP servers
remove directory traversal characters in order to blacklist
specific files such as ”.htpasswd” and ”/etc/passwd” while
allowing maximum flexibility in accessing most other files in
the current HTTP servers directory.
While the HTTP servers seem to have no directory traversal
related vulnerabilities because of the code shown in Fig. 3, this
algorithm, like many other algorithms that try this approach,
contains semantic errors. If assuming that the functions name,
de dotdot, implies only that all ”..” tokens are removed from
the pathstring, then the function is semantically incorrect as the
path string ”/etc../” contains ”..” tokens and is untouched by the
sanitizations. On the other hand, if assuming that this function
means to prevent directory traversal, it is still incorrect as it
does not consider path strings starting from the root directory–
e.g. ”/etc/passwd”–that traverse the file system bottom-up and
still resulting in directory traversal vulnerabilities1.
The problem with these types of approaches is that they
are difficult to test and verify. Testers cannot think of all
possible malicious path strings to test against, and verification
by formal methods or symbolic execution face path explosion
problems with the number of string operations contained inside
of unbounded loops [7]. Holes in test coverage of algorithms
adopting this approach can end up missing directory traver-
sal vulnerabilities causing vulnerabilities such as CVE-2018-
18778 in mini httpd and thttpd [9], [10], [15].
2) Canonicalizing Path Strings: Functions that canonicalize
path strings such as coreutils realpath [12] or the PHP pro-
gramming languages realpath [13] resolve a user-supplied path
string to a unique, absolute path string by expanding symbolic
links and resolving directory references such as ”/./”, ”/../”, and
extra ”/” characters [12], [14]. This means that even though
there are theoretically infinitely many ways to refer to the same
file–e.g. ”/etc/passwd”, ”/../etc/passwd”, ”/../../etc/passwd”,
”//etc//passwd”– after canonicalization, they all equal the same
path string.
These canonicalization functions are effective for those who
need to actually canonicalize path strings but overkill for those
that only need to prevent directory traversal attacks. Since
these functions resolve symbolic links, they must make system
calls or at least access the filesystem [11]. This means that the
underlying implementation of these functions is often more
complex than other approaches and less portable. For example,
porting PHP code using realpath to another programming
language or web application framework means rewriting the
realpath function.
1We believe that this flaw has been fixed by the most recent patch, version
1.30, to mini httpd that addresses CVE-2018-18778 [10], [15]. However,
the fix for preventing bottom-up-directory-traversal attacks has been applied
outside of the de dotdot function meaning that the de dotdot method is still
semantically incorrect.
Fig. 3. Code to remove traversal characters from user-supplied path strings
in mini httpd and t httpd [9], [10]
3) Whitelisting: Whitelisting is a very effective approach to
preventing directory traversal attacks but has some problems
when used alone [8]. Mentioned before, there are infinitely
many ways to refer to the same file on a file system given
that the length of the path string is not bounded. While
effective in some scenarios, whitelist-only approaches can
be overly strict if they do not canonicalize and allow the
infinitely many other path strings that refer to a file. Since
the specification of whitelisted files often happens during
development, it could be difficult for these mitigations to
securely adapt to circumstances where the whitelist needs to be
updated dynamically. Further, if whitelisted directories contain
symbolic links pointing to non-whitelisted directories or files,
attackers can abuse these symbolic links to bypass defenses
and traverse the file system.
III. ALGORITHM
The main algorithm, shown in Algorithm 1 and named
sanitize for ease of reference, is simple and intuitive. The
algorithm takes a user-supplied path string and a list of
whitelisted path strings as input. It returns true if the canonical-
ized user-supplied path string is in the whitelisted path string
list and false otherwise. An example of an implementation
written in the C programming language is available on GitHub
[16].
Algorithm 1: sanitize
Input: userSuppliedPathString : string
Input: whitelistedPathStrings : stringarray
Output: true or false
1 stack ← a stack initialized to be empty;
2 tokens← tokenize(userSuppliedPathString);
3 for i← 0 to tokens.size− 1 do
4 currentToken← tokens[i]; if
currentToken = ”..” then
5 if stack.size = 0 then
6 continue;
7 else
8 stack.pop;
9 else if currentToken = ”.” then
10 continue;
11 else
12 stack.push(currentToken);
13 if whitelistedPathStrings.contains(stack.toString())
then
14 return true;
15 else
16 return false;
Algorithm 2: toString() method of stack
1 s← stack object
2 result← ”/”
3 if s.size > 0 then
4 for i← 0 to s.size do
5 result.append(s.data[i]);
6 if i 6= (s.size− 1) then
7 result.append(”/”);
8 return result;
We start by initializing an empty stack object that only
needs to support the common push, pop, and size methods
as well as one extra method shown in Algorithm 2: toString.
We tokenize the user-supplied path string on all substrings
composed of single or repeated occurrences of the ”/” charac-
ter. For the proof-of-concept C code we provide, we tokenize
the user-supplied path string using the strtok r function of
strings.h [17] with ”/” supplied as the separator argument.
After tokenization, each token represents a directory in the
path string and is pushed to the stack. If a token with value
”.” is detected, it is ignored, and if a token with value ”..” is
detected we discard it and pop off the most recently pushed
token to the stack.
We make the assumption that user-supplied path strings
do not contain symbolic links or wildcard characters such
as ”?” or ”*”. If symbolic link functionality is necessary,
implementers may add symbolic links to the list of whitelisted
path strings instead of trying to modify sanitize to resolve
these symbolic links. This alleviates the need for the sanitize
function to call into the file system and removes any security
holes created by a whitelist-only mitigation procedure.
A. Proof of Correctness
We start the proof of correctness off with some definitions
to formally define and clarify phrases needed in later proofs.
Definition 1. A path string is a string that contains only valid
filename characters and the ”.” and ”/” characters and is of
the form ”/file1/file2/.../filen” where filen is the filename
of the target file. From this point forward, the ”...” token in
a path string stands for an ellipsis and represents a variable
amount of directories and not a directory named ”...” or a
directory traversal character.
Definition 2. A path string, S1, is a prefix of another path
string, S2, if and only if S1.length <= S2.length and for all
positive integers, i, [i : 0 <= i <= S1.length], S1[i] = S2[i].
We will later refer to stacks being prefixes of another string;
this just means that if K is a stack, then K.toString() is a
prefix of the other string.
Definition 3. Path strings S1 and S2 are equivalent path
strings if and only if S1.length = S2.length and S1 and
S2 are prefixes of each other. In other words, a typical string
comparison of S1 and S2 will say that they are equal strings.
Definition 4. A path string, S1, contains a directory or
filename, filen, if and only if the string ”/filen/” is a
substring of S1. For example, the path string ”/etc/passwd”
contains the directory ”etc” because ”/etc/” is a substring
of ”/etc/passwd”. It is not enough to check that the string
name of the directory is a substring of the path string since
”my dir” is a substring of ”/my dir1/”even though the path
string does not contain a directory named ”my dir”.
Lemma 1. If the user-supplied path string is bounded in
length, then the algorithm terminates.
Proof. If the supplied path string has length, L, then the loop
runs at most L times. Since operating systems normally set a
maximum length of path strings, this max length is an upper
bound on the number of possible loop iterations. For Linux
operating systems, this length is typically 4096 characters.
Lemma 2. If S1 and S2 both refer to the same file on the
filesystem, and–without loss of generality–S2 is canonicalized
and S1 may or may not be canonicalized, then S1.length >=
S2.length.
Proof. In the case that both S1 and S2 are canonicalized,
S1.length = S2.length. However, if S1 is not canonicalized,
then S1 must contain directories that S2 does not contain or S1
contains duplicate copies of directories contained in S2 all of
which must be popped off the stack by ”..” directories. This
follows from the assumptions that neither S1 or S2 contain
symbolic links and that S1 and S2 both refer to the same
file.
Lemma 3. If S1 and S2 both refer to the same file on the
filesystem, and–without loss of generality–S2 is canonicalized
but S1 may or may not be canonicalized, then at any iteration,
i, of the algorithms loop, one of the following is true:
1) The stack of S1 is a prefix of S2, or
2) If a directory is pushed to S1’s stack that makes S1’s
stack become not a prefix of S2, then this directory must
eventually be popped off the stack by a following ”..”
directory.
Proof. Path string, S1’s, stack starts as ”/” which is a prefix
of all possible path strings since all path strings are absolute
path strings, so Condition1 is met before the loop starts. From
here, there are two cases: the case where S1 is canonicalized
and the case where S1 is not canonicalized.
Case 1: Path strings S2 and S1 are both canonicalized. Sup-
pose S2 is the path string, ”/a1/a2/.../ai”. Then the first
directory of S1 pushed to the stack must be a1 keeping S1’s
stack a prefix of S2 since ”/a1/” is a prefix of ”/a1/a2/.../ai”.
Any next token keeps S1’s stack a prefix of S2, so Condition1
holds. At the end of the loop, the string representation of S1’s
stack is equal to the path string S2 meaning that S1 is still a
prefix of S2 and that the invariant still holds.
Case 2: Path string S2 is canonicalized, but path string S1 is
not canonicalized. We use the coloring scheme presented in
Fig. 4 to visualize path strings. A directory is green if it is
contained in both S1 and S2 in its correct place in the path
string. A directory is red if it is not contained by both S1 and
S2 or if it is in the incorrect place in the path string.
If S1 and S2 both refer to the same file and there are
no symbolic links in either, then any red directory that is
added must be removed by a matching ”..” directory afterward
as shown by Fig. 4. By contradiction, if any of these red
directories that make S1 become not a prefix of S2 are not
popped off, then there is a red directory in the path string of
S1 meaning that S1 and S2 could not possibly refer to the
same file.
Fig. 4. Example of sanitize processing a path string of which condition2
of Lemma3 holds true.
Theorem 1. Assuming that no path string contains symbolic
links and that whitelisted path string S2 is canonicalized while
user-supplied path string S1 may or may not be canonicalized,
Fig. 5. Example of sanitizes stack after processing/popping all red tiles off.
then sanitize(S1, [S2]) is true if and only if path strings S1
and S2 refer to the same file on the file system.
Proof.
(⇒) : If sanitize(S1, [S2]) is true, then path strings
S1 and S2 refer to the same file on the file system. Since
sanitize(S1, [S2]) returned true, [S2].contains(S1) must
have returned true. Since the whitelisted path string array,
[S2], contains only path string S2, S2 must be equal to S1.
(⇐) : If path strings S1 and S2 refer to the same file
on the file system, then sanitize(S1, [S2]) is true. We work
backward to prove this starting at the last iteration of the
for loop in the algorithm. We can choose to start at the last
iteration because we know by Lemma1 that the algorithm
terminates. We know by Lemma3 that one of the two
statements in the invariant must hold.
Since we are on the last iteration of the loop and processing
the last token, An, then one of three things is true:
1) An belongs to S2,
2) An is the token ”..”,
3) or, An is the token ”.”.
We first prove by contradiction that An is one of the above
claimed tokens. We suppose that we are on the last iteration
of the loop and the last token, An, is a directory that does
not belong to S2 which is the fourth and only other option.
However, if An doesnt belong to S2 and S1 and S2 both
refer to the same file, then by the red-green example from
Lemma3, we must process an additional ”..” directory to
pop this directory off. Therefore, we could not be on the last
iteration of the loop.
Now we prove that the invariant holds on the three possible
cases/token values of An proposed before:
Case 3: An belongs to S2. Since we are processing the last
token and S1 and S2 refer to the same file, then S1 remains
a prefix of S2. Therefore, the string version of S1’s stack is
equal to path string S2, so sanitize(S1, [S2]) must return true
since [S2].contains(S1) returns true.
Case 4: An is the directory ”..” If this is the case, then the
previous token, An−1 is a red directory not contained by S2.
Therefore, the current ”..” token must pop this red directory
off causing S1 to once again become a prefix of S2. Since this
is the last iteration, the string version of S1’s stack is equal to
the path string S2 minus the additional wrong directory at the
end of S1’s stack string. Popping off this last directory makes
sanitize(S1, [S2]) true.
Case 5: An is the directory ”.”. If we have a path string, Sn,
adding a ”/./” directory makes Sn still refer to the same file
by the sanitize algorithm because ”/./” tokens are ignored.
This means that the previous token kept S1 a prefix of S2
and the string version of S1’s stack equal to S2, and since
”.” is ignored, this remains true after this last iteration. Thus,
sanitize(S1, [S2]) returns true.
Finally, since we use the contain smethod for arrays/lists
to check if the path string is whitelisted, the default behavior
of sanitize is to disallow all path strings. Then, if the path
string, S2, is added to the whitelisted path strings array, then
by the theorem proved above, only path strings referring to
the same file as S2a re allowed.
IV. TESTING AND VERIFICATION STRATEGY
One of the largest advantages and motivations of the
sanitize algorithm is its ease of verification. We will show
two example verification strategies by first enumerating all
possible inputs that lead to sanitize outputting a particular
string [7] and second by showing that no traversal characters
are left in the output string. For verification, we run KLEE
symbolic execution engine [18] on a machine with a dual-core
Intel i5-7200U CPU and 8 GB of RAM. The code provided
on GitHub [16] contains code with all of the tweaks necessary
for using KLEE and all output from each symbolic execution
run described below.
For ease-of-use, we use a slightly modified version of
sanitize that returns the canonicalized copy of the input string
instead of a boolean. We also substitute directory and file
names in the path string by single-letter names to avoid path
explosion problems [7]. For example, we represent the path
string ”/home/user/.ssh/” by the new path string ”/a/b/c/”, with
”a” representing ”home”, ”b” representing ”user”, and ”c”
representing ”.ssh”. By doing this, we can also get away with
symbolically executing sanitize on a much shorter string. In
our case, we will use strings with length at most 12 characters.
We mark this input string to sanitize as symbolic input using
the klee make symbolic function and tell KLEE to make the
last character in the string, path string, a null terminator by
using the klee assumefunction.
For our first example, we can enumerate all input path
strings that result in sanitize returning the path string
”/a/b/c” by adding the following code to the end of sanitize:
if(!strncmp(”/a/b/c”, canonicalizedString, 6))
klee assert(0);
and passing KLEE the -emit-all-errors flag. We run KLEE
on this modified sanitize code, and the verification runs
in about 137.23 seconds. After this run, KLEE presents us
with 1142 unique input path strings that cause sanitize to
return the path string, ”/a/b/c”. Looking at some of the 1142
input path strings that result in this path string, most are
just the same path string, ”/a/b/c”, with variable amounts of
the ”/” character separating the directories–e.g. ”//a//b/c”,
”a/b/c////”, ”//a//b///c”, etc. This is caused by our usage of the
c function strtok r for tokenizing path strings which can
split on contiguous sequences of the desired token character.
Other path strings have extra ”/./”and ”/../” tokens throughout
that still keep the output path string equivalent to the input
path string–e.g. ”a/.//b/c”, ”../a/b/c”, ”./a/b/c”, etc. By a quick
sweep through all 1142 input path strings that result in an
output of ”/a/b/c”, we can see that all of these strings are
safe to be allowed through when ”/a/b/c” is whitelisted and
that there are no semantic issues with sanitize.
To verify that no directory traversal characters can bypass
our algorithm, we switch out the call to strncmp in our first
example for three new calls to klee assert where we make
one call each to make sure that each of ”/./”, ”/../”,and ”//”
do not appear in the output string. We then compile this new
code and run KLEE on it which takes about 323.00 seconds
total. Since KLEE emits no errors, this means that of all the
possible strings of length at most 12 characters, none can
contain directory traversal characters after being ran through
sanitize.
Because of how quick KLEE runs on the algorithm for
path strings of length at most 12 characters, verification of
the algorithm is quick enough for implementers to utilize
during short development cycles or for regression testing. And
while 12 characters might not seem like enough to test most
path strings, substituting directory and file names with single
character directory names like in the above example is an
effective and equivalent way to represent longer path strings
and to reduce run time of the symbolic execution engine.
V. ADVANTAGES, CONCERNS, AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
A. Advantages
There are many advantages of sanitize over other directory
traversal defenses. The algorithm is lightweight, easy to im-
plement, easy to verify, self-contained, and easily extendable.
While we implemented the algorithm in the C programming
language and had to provide our own stack implementation,
many programming languages used in popular web application
frameworks–e.g. Java, Ruby for Ruby-On-Rails, Python for
Django and Flask, etc.–provide their own standard library that
includes stacks or other containers implementing the stack
interface. This means that the implementation of sanitize
could be reduced down to one or two simple functions.
Because the algorithm is so simple and there are no calls to
any external libraries or file systems, developers of most any
skill level can port the algorithm to their language of choice.
Furthermore, since we have formally proved the correctness
of sanitize, the only burdens an implementer must take on
are making sure that their implementation closely follows the
algorithm and that there are no other issues such as memory-
safety issues, wrongly whitelisted path strings, etc.
The algorithms functionality is also simple to extend if
an implementer desires any additional functionality. While
potentially lowering the security posture of the algorithm,
implementers could extend the algorithm to allow special
characters such as wildcards for ease-of-use. Another exten-
sion is restricting all file operations to the current ’root’ of a
running web application; in this case, extending the algorithm
to prepend the web application root directorys absolute path to
the user-supplied path string before sanitize is ran is simple.
B. Concerns
While there are many advantages to using sanitize, the
algorithm does have some disadvantages. For example, im-
plementations of sanitize in non-memory-safe programming
languages require large amounts of unsafe operations such
as string copies and memory manipulation. Coupling our
algorithm with whitelisting presents a solid defense against
directory traversal attacks but opens implementers up to other
problems such as buffer overflows, out-of-bounds reads and
writes, etc. depending upon the implementation. However, this
flaw could also be viewed as an advantage, since fuzz-testing
for memory-safety issues is much simpler than proving that
others approaches to canonicalization are semantically correct.
Another disadvantage is that sanitize does not process
path strings in the same way as most operating systems or
file systems. The most notable side effect of this is that
path strings that the file system may view as invalid can
be marked as valid by sanitize. Take for example the path
string, ”/home/NonexistentUserFolder/../ActualUserFolder/”.
Our algorithm will canonicalize this path string to
”/home/ActualUserFolder/” which does exist. However, an
approach that uses the file system will try to traverse through
the first non-existent user directory, fail immediately, and say
that the overall path string or file does not exist.
A similar case results when sanitize encounters path strings
ending with the ”/./” directory. While file systems only allow
this ”/./” directory to refer to directories–i.e. ”/etc/./” is valid
because ”/etc/” is a directory, but ”/etc/passwd/./” is not valid
because ”/etc/passwd” is a file–sanitize allows the latter path
string as the ”/./” is simply ignored in the algorithms loop.
But since the whitelisted path strings should only contain
valid directories and files, these improper directory traversal
semantics do not pose problems.
C. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a new and simple algorithm for
preventing directory traversal attacks through canonicalization
of path strings. We analyzed the strengths and weaknesses
of some other common mitigations for these attacks and dis-
cussed how our algorithm is flexible and lightweight while still
remaining more secure than other similar solutions. Finally,
we provided a proof of correctness and some simple verifica-
tion strategies using symbolic execution–available along with
implementation code on GitHub–to prove that our algorithm
prevents directory traversal attacks when properly used.
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